The Forest Health Crisis: How Did We Get In This Mess?
Charles E. Kay. 2009. The Forest Health Crisis: How Did We Get In This Mess? Mule Deer Foundation Magazine No.26:14-21.
Dr. Charles E. Kay, Ph.D. Wildlife Ecology, Utah State University, is the author/editor of Wilderness and Political Ecology: Aboriginal Influences and the Original State of Nature [here], author of Are Lightning Fires Unnatural? A Comparison of Aboriginal and Lightning Ignition Rates in the United States [here], co-author of Native American influences on the development of forest ecosystems [here], and numerous other scientific papers.
Full text with photos (click on photos for larger images):
THE WEST is ablaze! Every summer large-scale, high-intensity crown fires tear through our public lands at ever increasing and unheard of rates. Our forests are also under attack by insects and disease. According to the national media and environmental groups, climate change is the villain in the present Forest Health Crisis and increasing temperatures, lack of moisture, and abnormally high winds are to blame. Unfortunately, nothing could be further from the truth.
The Sahara Desert, for instance, is hot, dry, and the wind blows, but the Sahara does not burn. Why? Because there are no fuels. Without fuel there is no fire. Period, end of story, and without thick forests there are no high-intensity crown fires. Might not the real problem then be that we have too many trees and too much fuel in our forests? The Canadians, for instance, have forest problems similar to ours but they do not call it a “Forest Health Crisis,” instead they call it a Forest Ingrowth Problem. The Canadians have correctly identified the issue, while we in the States have not. That is to say, the problem is too many trees and gross mismanagement by land management agencies, as well as outdated views of what is natural.
When Europeans first arrived in the West, ponderosa pine forests were open and park-like. You could ride everywhere on horseback or even in a horse and buggy, the forests were so open. On average there were only between 10 and 40 trees per acre with an understory of grasses, forbs, and shrubs. Extensive meadows were also common. In short, ideal mule dear habitat.
Photo 1 — A 1905 photograph of a ponderosa pine forest on the Kaibab in northern Arizona. It is amazing how parklike our pine forests once were. The forests were so open that you could travel virtually anywhere in a horse and buggy. Understory grasses, forbs, and shrubs were abundant. U.S. Geological Survey photo.
Photo 2 — A 1903 photograph of a ponderosa pine forest on the Coconino in northern Arizona. Note the park-like conditions and the men for scale, as well as the abundance of understory forage. Due to the openness of the forest, historically, crown fires never occurred, unlike conditions today. U.S. Forest Service photo.
Today, however, those same forests contain anywhere from 500 to 2,000 mostly smaller trees per acre. Travel on horseback is out of the question, and access by foot is even difficult. Many former meadows are now overgrown with trees. Understory forage production is approaching zero and our pine forests are becoming increasingly worthless as mule deer habitat.
The Wildland/Science Interface
Stephen J. Pyne. 2009. The Wildland/Science Interface. Copyright 2009 Stephen J. Pyne
Full text [here]
Selected excerpts:
A long narrow road winds steeply up into thickly-wooded backcountry to an exclusive enclave of costly structures, all well beyond the periphery of settlement. It’s the formula for the worstcase scenario of the wildland/urban interface, except that this is no subprime landscape stuffed with trophy homes. It’s a telescope complex atop Mount Graham, and on the Sky Islands of Arizona the scene is repeated four times. Call it the wildland/science interface.
Fire management accepts as axiomatic that it is science-based or at least science-informed and that good science is the antidote to the toxins of politics, land development, and a Smokey-blinkered populace that doesn’t understand the natural ecology and inevitability of fire. Science is better than experience or history, and more science is better still. Science, preferably natural science, since even social science is tainted with the implied values of its human doers, is the solution. At Mount Graham, however, it is the problem. And the challenge is not simply that “science” here underwrites its own version of the WUI and opens paved roads to remote sites that complicate fire management and compromise biodiversity. The real challenge is the assumption that science stands apart from the scene it describes and from its Olympian perch can peer objectively outward and advise wisely.
The Mount Graham International Observatory suggests instead, that science’s lofty perch is not removed from land management and that science, too, has its self-interests that can influence what it sees, does, and says. Science, in brief, is not an ungrounded platform for viewing the universe of fire and recording its observations. It is sited, and that siting determines what it sees, and decisions over such sites make science and its caste of practitioners as motivated by their own values and ambitions as loggers, ranchers, real estate developers, and ATV recreationists. Science has its own dynamic apart from nature, its own presence on the land, and its own politics. The 1.83 meter primary mirror of the VATT telescope, while nominally looking out, is also a reflecting lens that looks back on its viewers.
Fire Gods and Federal Policy
Thomas M. Bonnicksen, Ph.D. 1989. Fire Gods and Federal Policy. American Forests 95(7 & 8): 14-16, 66-68.
Full text:
THE ISSUE I am presenting is based on a summary of both the letter I sent to the Interagency Fire Management Policy Review Team and testimony I presented to a joint committee of Congress in January of 1989 on the Yellowstone wildfire problem. The issue is how to restore naturalness to park and wilderness areas while preventing such wildfires from occurring again. I will concentrate on the “let nature takes its course” philosophy that led to the Yellowstone fires. I will also provide a scientifically sound and responsible approach to resource management. My purpose is to encourage the use of scientific management in national park and wilderness areas.
I was critical of the Park Service fire management program when it started. I was a ranger-naturalist at Kings Canyon National Park where the program began. At that time, I wrote a white paper that pointed out the flaws in the fire management program and the entire ranger-naturalist staff agreed with my conclusions and signed the paper. This was the first documented internal Park Service critique of the fire management program. The points that we made so many years ago are still true today, only now the problem has grown worse and it has taken on a more ominous dimension with the Yellowstone wildfires.
I have been conducting research, publishing and speaking on fire management and restoration ecology in national park and wilderness areas for twenty years. Most of my research addressed the management of giant sequoia-mixed conifer forests in the Sierra Nevada. I also investigated the effects of the Yellowstone wildfires for members of Congress. After giving so much thought to this issue over so many years, I am convinced that the real problem is the lack of clear objectives for the management of national park and wilderness areas.
The wildfires that swept through Yellowstone and surrounding wilderness areas during the summer of 1988 were not a natural event. Unlike the eruption of Mount St. Helens (which could not be controlled) the number, size and destructiveness of the Yellowstone wildfires could have been substantially reduced. The changes that took place in the vegetation mosaic and fuels in Yellowstone during nearly a century of fire suppression were preventable and reversible. The Park Service was aware of the risks of letting lightning fires burn, especially during a drought. Mr. Howard T. Nichols, a Park Service Environmental Specialist sent to help in the command center during the Yellowstone wildfires, stated in an internal memo that members of the Yellowstone staff knew “that 1988 was a very dry year” yet they “were determined to maintain the Park’s natural fire regime.” Thus the Yellowstone wildfires were caused by a combination of decades of neglect and incredibly poor judgment.
Dr. James K. Brown, a Forest Service scientist, stated in a paper he delivered to the American Association for the Advancement of Science in January of 1989 that, assuming a prescribed burning program was initiated in 1972, “threats to villages may have been prevented or greatly reduced.” Dr. Brown also stated “a program of manager ignited prescribed burning in subalpine forests such as lodgepole pine” is “feasible.” In an earlier paper presented at the Wilderness Fire Symposium in Missoula, Montana, in 1983, Dr. Brown also said that “To manage for a natural role of fire, planned ignitions, in my view, are necessary to deal with fuels and topography that have high potential for fire to escape established boundaries.” Thus, it is likely that the wildfires would not have reached the mammoth size of 1.4 million acres if only a fraction of the hundreds of millions of dollars used to fight the Yellowstone wildfires had been spent on scientific management that utilized prescribed burning, especially if vigorous suppression efforts had been undertaken by the Park Service when each fire began.
Two Forests Under The Big Sky: Tribal V. Federal Management
Alison Berry. 2009. Two Forests Under The Big Sky: Tribal V. Federal Management. Property and Environment Research Center Policy Series No. 45, 2009
Full text [here]
Selected excerpts:
INTRODUCTION
Two forests: similar resources, different outcomes. In northwest Montana, the U.S. Forest Service and the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes (CSKT) oversee adjacent forests rich in pine, larch, and Douglas-fir. Both forests are managed for multiple resources, including timber production, recreation, and habitat for fish and wildlife. Despite many similarities, their economic and environmental performances differ.
National forests in the United States are not the harvest machines they once were. At the peak in 1987, these forests yielded 13 billion board feet in timber. Today, they produce a small fraction of that output. The harvest in 2008 was 2 billion board feet (USDA Forest Service 2008a). Critics of the Forest Service’s timber sale program may argue that this is a positive change since the Forest Service lost $88 million annually from below-cost timber sales in the late 1990s (USDA Forest Service 2001a).
There was also evidence of bloated operating costs and poor stewardship of watersheds and wildlife habitat (O’ Toole 1988; Leal 1995; Fretwell 1999). While the Forest Service is staffed with trained professionals, cumbersome regulations, environmental appeals, and political meddling interfere with responsible forest management.
With the decline of timber harvests, federal forest management and funding has increasingly focused on wildfire suppression. In 1991, 13 percent of the Forest Service budget was dedicated to fire management; by 2008 that figure had risen to 45 percent (USDA Forest Service 2008b). Although the agency’s stated goal is to reduce the risk of wildfire, most fire spending is devoted to a handful of large conflagrations — not prevention or restoration to avoid costly emergencies (O’Toole 2002; Berry 2008). …
EVOLUTION OF TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY
The evolution from federal control to tribal control of reservation forests offers an interesting comparison to national forests. Resources on Indian reservations were managed by the U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) for much of the last century. Although the BIA was put in charge ostensibly “to protect Indians and their resources from Indians” (Morishima 1997), it became clear that the agency did not always serve the best interests of the tribes. One study comparing tribal versus BIA management of forest resources on Indian reservations found that “as tribal control increases relative to BIA control, worker productivity rises, costs decline, and income improves. Even the price received for reservation logs increases” (Krepps 1992).
Causes of Post-Fire Runoff and Erosion: Water Repellency, Cover, or Soil Sealing?
Isaac J. Larsen, Lee H. MacDonald, Ethan Brown, Daniella Rough, Matthew J. Welsh, Joseph H. Pietraszek, Zamir Libohova, Juan de Dios Benavides-Solorio, Keelin Schaffrath. 2009. Causes of Post-Fire Runoff and Erosion: Water Repellency, Cover, or Soil Sealing? Soil Sci. Soc. Am. J. 73:1393-1407
Full text [here, 2.1MB]
Selected excerpts:
Abstract
Few studies have attempted to isolate the various factors that may cause the observed increases in peak flows and erosion after high-severity wildfires. This study evaluated the effects of burning by: (i) comparing soil water repellency, surface cover, and sediment yields from severely burned hillslopes, unburned hillslopes, and hillslopes where the surface cover was removed by raking; and (ii) conducting rainfall simulations to compare runoff , erosion, and surface sealing from two soils with varying ash cover. The fire-enhanced soil water repellency was only stronger on the burned hillslopes than the unburned hillslopes in the first summer after burning. For the first 5 yr after burning, the mean sediment yield from the burned hillslopes was 32 Mg ha-1, whereas the unburned hillslopes generated almost no sediment. Sediment yields from the raked and burned hillslopes were indistinguishable when they had comparable surface cover, rainfall erosivity, and soil water repellency values. The rainfall simulations on ash-covered plots generated only 21 to 49% as much runoff and 42 to 67% as much sediment as the plots with no ash cover. Soil thin sections showed that the bare plots rapidly developed a structural soil seal. Successive simulations quickly eroded the ash cover and increased runoff and sediment yields to the levels observed from the bare plots. The results indicate that: (i) post-fire sediment yields were primarily due to the loss of surface cover rather than fire-enhanced soil water repellency; (ii) surface cover is important because it inhibits soil sealing; and (iii) ash temporarily prevents soil sealing and reduces post-fire runoff and sediment yields.
Introduction
Wildfires increase hillslope- and watershed-scale runoff and sediment yields by several orders of magnitude (e.g., Prosser and Williams, 1998; Robichaud and Brown, 1999; Moody and Martin, 2001; Benavides-Solorio and MacDonald, 2005; Malmon et al., 2007). Land use and climate change have increased, or are projected to increase, the size and frequency of fires in many wildland environments (e.g., Mouillot et al., 2002; Hennessy et al., 2005; Westerling et al., 2006). The increase in fire risk is generating considerable concern about the potential adverse effects on water quality, aquatic habitat, and water supply systems (Rinne, 1996; Robichaud et al., 2000; Moody and Martin, 2001; Burton, 2005).
The large increases in runoff and sediment yields after high-severity fires have been attributed to several factors, including: (i) soil water repellency (DeBano, 2000; Doerr et al., 2000); (ii) loss of surface cover ( Johansen et al., 2001; Pannkuk and Robichaud, 2003); (iii) soil sealing by sediment particles (Lowdermilk, 1930; Neary et al., 1999); and (iv) soil sealing by ash particles (Mallik et al., 1984; Etiégni and Campbell, 1991). The problem is that the relative contribution of each factor to the observed increases in post-fire runoff and sediment yields is largely unknown (Shakesby et al., 2000; Letey, 2001). This lack of understanding hampers our ability to predict post-fire sediment yields and design effective post-fire rehabilitation treatments.
Impacts of California Wildfires on Climate and Forests: A Study of Seven Years of Wildfires (2001-2007)
Thomas M. Bonnicksen. 2009. Impacts of California Wildfires on Climate and Forests: A Study of Seven Years of Wildfires (2001-2007). FCEM Report No. 3. The Forest Foundation, Auburn, CA.
Full text [here]
See also FCEM Reports No. 1 and 2 [here]
Selected Excerpts:
Executive Summary
This study (FCEM Report No. 3) and the previous study (FCEM Report No. 2), use a new computer model, the Forest Carbon and Emissions Model (FCEM), to estimate greenhouse gas emissions from wildfires and insect infestations, and opportunities to recover these emissions and prevent future losses.
This report shows that the wildfires that scorched California from 2001 to 2007 seriously degraded the state’s forests and contributed to global warming. Political and economic obstacles to managing forests and restoring burned forests are the root causes of the wildfire crisis.
The impact of California’s wildfires on climate and forests is one of the most important issues of our time. It is imperative to take action now to prevent the annual recurrence of disastrous and costly fire seasons.
The wildfire crisis is becoming more serious each year. Fires are getting bigger, more destructive, and more expensive. In 2001, California wildfires burned one-half million acres. In 2007, 1.1 million acres burned, and an estimated 1.4 million acres burned in 2008 destroying 1,000 homes. This was the most destructive fire season in the state’s history and 2009 could be worse.
From 2001 to 2007, fires burned more than 4 million acres and released an estimated 277 million tons of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere from combustion and the post-fire decay of dead trees. That is an average of 68 tons per acre. These wildfires also kill wildlife, pollute the air and water, and strip soil from hillsides. The greenhouse gases they emit are wiping out much of what is being achieved to reduce emissions from fossil fuels to battle global warming.
The emissions from only the seven years of wildfires documented in this study are equivalent to adding an estimated 50 million more cars onto California’s highways for one year, each spewing tons of greenhouse gases. Stated another way, this means all 14 million cars in California would have to be locked in a garage for three and one-half years to make up for the global warming impact of these wildfires.
U.S. Wildfire Cost-Plus-Loss Economics Project: The “One-Pager” Checklist
Zybach, Bob, Michael Dubrasich, Gregory Brenner, and John Marker. 2009. U.S. Wildfire Cost-Plus-Loss Economics Project: The “One-Pager” Checklist. Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center [here], Advances in Fire Practices, Fall 2009.
Full text [here]
Selected excerpts:
What are the actual costs of a wildfire?
Official Forest Service tallies usually include suppression expenses only. Media reports sometimes include estimates of damage to homes and infrastructure. But the economic impacts of wildfires are far-reaching and new (and old) research shows the need for improved cost estimates of wildfire.
Large wildfires consume more than just suppression expenses (“costs”) – they also do measurable short- and long-term damages (“loss”) to public and private equity and resources. Traditional fire appraisal uses the term “cost-plus-loss” to account for all the economic impacts of wildfire. This econometric analysis method is sometimes expressed as LCD (least cost plus damage) or C+NVC (costs plus net value change). The goal (economic utility) of fire suppression is to minimize cost-plus-loss.
Recently analysts, government officials, and the media have drawn increasing attention to the escalating frequency, severity, and costs over and above fire suppression associated with large-scale forest wildfires – including losses of human lives, homes, pets, crops, livestock and environmental damage.
* The Western Forestry Leadership Coalition recently released a report entitled “The True Cost of Wildfire in the Western U.S.” (Dale et al 2009). The authors examined six major US wildfires, and compared suppression costs and tactics with “total costs.” Two examples of this process were the 2000 Cerro Grande fire in New Mexico (shown to have suppression costs that reflected only 3% of total damage estimates), and the 2003 Old, Grand Prix, and Padua fire complex in California, in which suppression costs were only 7% of total costs to date – with total losses expected to increase dramatically in years to come (Dunn et al, 2005).
* The 2003 fires in San Diego and Southern California were a disaster by any measure – 24 fatalities, over 3,700 homes destroyed. At the time, the costs of the suppression efforts were staggering, $43 million. However, Matt Rahn, a researcher from San Diego State University, recently presented findings that put this figure at less than 2% of the total long-term cost of the fire (Rahn, 2009).
* The Hayman Fire (2002) burned 138,000 acres and cost $42,279,000 ($307/acre) to suppress. But Professor Dennis Lynch of Colorado State University estimated that an additional $187,500,000 ($1,358/acre) in losses had accrued within a year. Suppression costs were only 18% of the total, and Dr. Lynch stated, “I recognized the need to follow costs into subsequent years to more completely identify a fire’s true impact” (Lynch, 2004).
To date, our own findings paint a far different picture than that commonly reported by the media or understood by the public. We have found that total short-term and long-term cost-plus-loss attributed to wildfires typically attains amounts that are ten, 20, or 30 times reported suppression expenses.
Aspen: A Vanishing Resource
Charles E. Kay. 2009. Aspen: A Vanishing Resource. Mule Deer Foundation Magazine, No. 25, pp. 32-39.
Full text (without photos):
I have conducted scientific research on aspen for more than 25 years. During that time, I have personally measured more aspen stands in a greater number of locations than any other ecologist, living or dead. I have also personally measured more aspen exclosures than any person who has ever lived. In addition, I have made more than 800 repeat photosets depicting aspen.
My research, as well as that for others, has documented a major decline in aspen throughout intermountain North America since European settlement. Historical research and repeat photographs indicate that declines of 60% to 90% are common. My home state of Utah, for example, once contained over two million acres of aspen, but today there are less than 800,000 acres and aspen is still being lost. Moreover, many western aspen stands contain old-age or single-age trees and have not successfully regenerated for 80 years or longer. Colorado and other areas in the West have recently experienced the demise of large blocks of aspen — termed Sudden Aspen Decline Syndrome. All this should be of critical concern to readers of Muley Crazy because aspen provides ideal habitat for mule deer. IDEAL! Or at least it once did.
Before we can understand why aspen has declined, why aspen is still in serious freefall, and what we and the land management agencies can do to reverse that trend, a short lesson in aspen autecology is in order. We also need to dispel some serious myths about aspen. First, as any textbook will tell you, aspen is the most widely distributed tree in North America. Second, aspen is a clonal species and what we commonly call trees are actually ramets, having risen from a common root source via suckering. This means that the clone is the individual, not each tree. Moreover, many western aspen clones are quite large, often an acre or more in size, and one clone on Utah’s Fishlake National Forest, named Pando, has been identified as the largest living organism on Earth — a fact recently confirmed by genetic analysis. Pando covers approximately 106 acres, contains an estimated 50,000 trees (ramets), and weighs approximately 6,000 tons.
In a landscape dominated by large blocks of aspen, individual clones are easiest to spot during spring leaf-out or during autumn, as different clones produce new leaves at slightly different rates and turn color, or different colors, at slightly different times. One would have to be very cold-hearted not to appreciate aspen in all its golden fall splendor! This is why, when asked, I tell everyone that I study charismatic megaFLORA! There is nothing quite like hunting mule deer, or elk, in aspen during autumn, expect perhaps chasing gray ghosts in the lowveld.
In most years, aspen produces millions of viable seeds, but seedings and clonal establishment from seed are virtually non-existent. To survive, aspen seedlings need bare mineral soil, no competing vegetation, and high soil moisture throughout germination and the first summer of life. Conditions that simply do not exist in the West today. Given aspen’s demanding seedbed requirements, it is thought that the environment has not been conducive to seedling growth and the widespread establishment of new clones since shortly after the glaciers retreated 10,000 or more years ago. This means that the clones you see in the West today have likely survived for thousands of years via vegetative, also called asexual, reproduction or regeneration.
Testimony of Dr. Peter Kolb on Mountain Pine Beetle
Peter Kolb. 2009. Testimony of Dr. Peter Kolb, Montana State University, before the House Natural Resources Subcommittee on Water and Power Hearing on Mountain Pine Beetle: Strategies For Protecting The West, June 16, 2009.
Full text [here]
Selected excerpts:
My name is Peter Kolb, and I am the Montana State University Extension Forestry Specialist and an Associate Professor of Forest Ecology and Management at the University of Montana College of Forestry and Conservation. I’m here today speaking on behalf of the Society of American Foresters (SAF), an organization of over 15,000 forest managers, researchers, and educators. I’ve been a SAF member for 27 years.
I am here today to offer you my testimony with regard to the bark beetle situation across western forests with specific reference to the conditions across the Montana with which I am most familiar. My perspective is not that of an entomologist, but that of a forest ecologist and management specialist whose main work objective is to help implement the results and conclusion of scientific research into practical working applications. I work in both academic circles as an applied researcher and educator, and in the forest practitioners’ realm, which gives me the opportunity not only to conduct relevant research, but to examine the effects of forestry applications. Just three days ago I returned from a week of working with family landowners and the Cree and Chippewa tribes of central Montana where we examined the forest conditions there and the effectiveness of various forest practices in combating a mountain pine beetle outbreak in the Bearpaw Mountains.
Bark Beetles
The bark beetle outbreak we are experiencing across the entire western portion of North America is the result of multiple ecological factors converging at the same time. Its occurrence is not a surprise for foresters across western forests as the current expansiveness of bark beetle activity has been building for many years. Bark beetles such as mountain pine beetles, one of the main culprits in the current outbreaks, have been extensively studied since the mid 1970s. Its life cycle and ecology are very well understood. It has been a natural part of western forests for millennia and its population cycles are fairly predictable. Under what we would characterize the average forest and climatic conditions of the past century it exists as a chronic population within pine forests, colonizing and killing trees that are unable or incapable of defending themselves due to a variety of physiological, genetic or environmental factors. It may be considered analogous to wolves circling a herd of caribou, culling out the weak, unfit and injured. As with any species, bark beetles have numerous pests and predators themselves including a variety of predatory beetles, wasps, nematodes, mites, fungal diseases, and larger predators such as bark gleaning birds and woodpeckers. Depending on the populations of these predators and pests, chronic bark beetle populations might be kept in check.
Fire History and Research, Big Bar Ranger District, Northwestern Trinity County, California: Critique of Fire Suppression Practices
Concerned Citizens for Responsible Fire Management*. 2008. Fire History and Research, Big Bar Ranger District, Northwestern Trinity County, California: Critique of Fire Suppression Practices. Report to Congressman Wally Herger, October 2008
* David Rhodes, Committee Chairperson, Lewiston, 37 years in Trinity County, retired, 30 years with the U. S. Forest Service (all in fire and fuels management); 11 years on the Angeles National Forest with 5 of those years as Hotshot Crew Foreman and the remainder as Fire Prevention Technician and Engine Captain. 19 years on the Big Bar Ranger District in Fire, Fuels Management and Law Enforcement, the last 15 of those years as Fire Management Officer. Large Fire Qualifications, Class I Operations Chief, Class II Incident Commander, Division Supervisor, Helitorch Burn Boss, and Fire Behavior Officer, and Class II Planning Section Chief. Incident Commander on the Shasta-Trinity Class II Fire Team for 14 years. Fuels Management Qualifications: Prescribed Fire Manager for Multi-Burns, Burn Boss, and Helitorch Burn Boss.
Charley Fitch, Redding, California resident for the last 42 years, having lived in Southern, Central and Northern California amongst the National Forests, employed by the Forest Service. Twenty of the years were in Trinity County as District Ranger for the Big Bar Ranger District, later incorporated into the Trinity River Management Unit, before retiring in January 1999. Fire suppression experience with the Forest Service included fire assignments ranging over 35 years. Positions included Crew Boss, Sector Boss, Division Supervisor, Forest Supervisor’s Representative, Planning Section Chief Type II, Liaison Officer for both Type I and Type II Incident Teams as well as Line Officer for fires located within my Ranger District. I am a professional forester with a degree from Colorado State University in Forest Management. Other experience with fire beyond being a firefighter was as a project leader for controlled burns and a land manager dealing with post-fire land management.
Michael Jameson, Weaverville, resident of Trinity County for 18 years, retired California Department of Forestry (CALFIRE). Started with CDF as a seasonal firefighter in 1978 with the San Bernardino Ranger Unit. Promoted to Engineer in San Bernardino and worked in both schedule A and schedule B contracts (Structure and Wildland Fires). Promoted to Captain in 1987 at the Fenner Canyon Camp in Los Angeles County, transferred to the Pilot Rock Camp in San Bernardino and then Trinity River Camp in Lewiston in 1990. Qualified for Division/Group Supervisor, Map display processor, Field Observer, Strike Team Leader and Task Force Leader. 25 years all in fire control.
Clarence Rose, Weaverville, Trinity County resident since 1974. Oregon State University graduate, B.S. in Forest Engineering, 1974. California Registered Professional Forester since 1977. Member of California Board of Forestry, 1985-89. Founder and co-owner of R&R Timber Co., Inc., a logging company which was active in contract logging in Trinity County from 1979-1998, averaging 2000+ truckloads of logs per year, and which provided contract heavy equipment (dozers, water tenders) to CDF and USFS. Currently owner and manager of 1,000 acres of sustainably managed commercial timberland in Trinity and Shasta County. Member of Weaverville Community Forest steering committee, which works with Trinity County Resource Conservation District to attain fire-safe, fire-resilient forests on public lands in the Weaverville basin. Volunteer missionary in Russia (1994-95) and Ukraine (2001-2005). Member of initial board of directors of Mountain Communities Healthcare District, which owns and operates the formerly county-owned Trinity Hospital.
Jerry McDonald, Lewiston, 40 years in Trinity County, retired, 30 years with the Forest Service, 27 of those years in fire and fuels management. District Fire Management Officer, Calaveras and Miwok districts, 4 years; retired as Stanislaus National Forest fire staff operations; Type II Team Deputy Incident Commander and, Operations Section and Safety Officer, Type I Team Safety Officer; prescribed fire manager for helitorch and hand fire; Interdisciplinary team leader and NEPA team leader for fuels and fire projects; fuels committee chair for Stanislaus National Forest for 5 years; member of Forest Service Southwest Region fuels committee for 6 years; HAZMAT coordinator, Spill Response coordinator; agency representative on fires and other projects, including with CDF; Forest representative for local fire companies in Calaveras and Tuolumne counties.
Frank Grovers, Big Bar, 11 years in Trinity County with an RV park business along the Trinity River; 40 years in sales experience in the U.S. and foreign countries, dealt with different teenagers in a counseling capacity, involved with church and local community; three children, five grandchildren, two great-grandchildren. 2008-09 Trinity County Grand Jury.
Stan Stetson, Hayfork, in 1968 began working summers for the U.S. Forest Service in Trinity County while attending Humboldt State College. Upon graduating continued to work seasonally in fire prevention, fuels and fire suppression until 1973 when I received a permanent appointment. Worked as Engine Foreman until 1979 when I became a Timber Sale Administrator. Retired after 36 years, all in Trinity County, having served as Division Supervisor, Strike Team Leader, Burn Boss, Logistics and Ground Support Leader in Fire organization and Supervisor in Timber sale preparation and administration. Three years with Watershed Center as Project Coordinator for fuels reduction and thinning operations. Present Commissioner of the Hayfork Fire Protection District. Currently retired and concerned citizen.
Dana Hord, Junction City, Trinity County resident 1993-present, business owner, Trinity River Rafting, Big Flat. Trinity River Rafting features scenic quality of the Wild and Scenic Trinity River and is tourism based. Appointed Member of Trinity Adaptive Management Working Group for Trinity River Restoration Program, 2001-present, representing Big Bar Community Development Group. Dana has been actively involved in the transition of the local economy from one focused on commodity production to one that is more dependent on tourism and recreation. Ms. Hord has a degree in sociology, and experience in small business management, grants administration, and public relations. Junction City Volunteer Fire Dept., 2002-present, trained in wildland fire suppression, and structural fire protection. Former Aide, U.S. Senator S.I. Hayakawa. Daughter of Donna Hord, deceased, Shasta County GOP delegate.
Gay Berrien, Committee Secretary, Big Bar, 45 years in Trinity County in Denny and Big Bar; retired U.S. Forest Service employee, clerk and archaeological technician for 30 years mostly Big Bar Ranger District; wrote all news releases for Big Bar for first several years of 1970s including articles on fire suppression, fuels reduction, controlled burns, special high elevation fire study (study by a fire behavior specialist, first such study in Forest Service Southwest Region), attended 32-hour fire training (but only participated in one controlled burn from 9 a.m. one morning until 9 a.m. the next and was on fire standby at Denny Guard Station one day), responded to fire assignments as initial attack and communications dispatcher, fire information officer, personnel time recorder, and procurement officer; Trinity County Historical Society board of directors, 2008-09 Trinity County Grand Jury.
Full text [here]
Selected excerpts:
CONTENTS
Cover Letter to Congressman Herger/Introduction ………. 3
Meet the Committee ……………………………….. 12
Fire Location Map 1999-2008 ……………………….. 14
One-Page Summary of Catastrophic Fire Analysis ………. 15
2006 Catastrophic Fire Analysis ……………………. 16
Fire and Forest Management on the Big Bar District …… 23
Local Businesses Affected by 2006 & 2008 Fires ………. 28
Heritage Resources in Iron/Alps Complex 2008 ………… 29
Big Bar Ranger District Annual Rainfall …………….. 31
Typical Fire Suppression 1930s-1970s ……………….. 33
Jim Jam Fire of 1951 ……………………………… 36
Denny Guard Station Removal ……………………….. 37
How Liability Fears Affect Fire Suppression …………. 41
Fires Burned Nationwide by Decade Compared with Timber Harvest, Fire Suppression Policies and Local Rainfall* ………………………. 43
* added after October 10 meeting with Congressman Herger
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