SOS Forests

It’s the Fuels, Stupid

I am working on a series of posts about Sierra Nevada fires. This particular post was to be one of them, and so by prematurely placing it here I am putting it a little out of order.

But, the issue of fuels and fire intensity is important and timely. Esteemed Australian forester Roger Underwood, Chairman of The Bush Fire Front, said [here]:

If fuels are allowed to accumulate, bushfires in eucalypt forests rapidly attain an intensity that exceeds the human capacity to extinguish them, notwithstanding the most modern and massive suppression forces.

Communities and economic assets in the path of high intensity fires will suffer horrible damage.

But! Potential damage can be minimised by application of a fire management system that incorporates responsible planning, and high standards of preparedness and damage mitigation, especially fuel reduction.

In short, excessive fuels contribute to fire severity and intensity, endangering forests, natural resources, and communities.

THE DEBATE ABOUT FUELS MANAGEMENT IS OVER. The scientific consensus is universal. Fuels management reduces fire intensity. Period. The end. Only a pro-holocaust terrorist or a moron would say otherwise.

And yet morons exist, in droves, and they continue to question the basic fact that fires burn biomass. My friend and highly regarded Australian Mountain Cattleman Phil Maguire of Bundarrah Days [here] notes that this kind moronity plagues Australia just as it does America.

The National Parks Advisory Council has the same problem with fuel reduction burning as every other radical green group. They claim it’s not effective. After the 2003 fires they stated in a submission to the Esplin Inquiry - a submission riddled with contradictions - that…

“Under extreme fire behaviour, when fires sweep through the tree crowns and spot many kilometres ahead, previously fuel reduced areas become largely ineffective in halting the fire front, though they may help reduce spread and damage around the flanks.”

That statement is counter-factual. There are innumerable cases where canopy fires dropped to ground when encountering thinned and fuel-managed areas. Recent megafires in AU and the USA were eventually contained, and the containment lines were all in reduced fuel areas. Fire suppression efforts were successful where fuels were limited, and unsuccessful where they were not.

The implication of the National Parks Advisory Council’s statement is that fires occur absent human intervention. That is patently absurd. Intervention is always applied to large fires — the question is where are the suppression efforts effective? The answer is where fuels have been reduced. In every case.

The following narrative is from the post-fire report on the Rich Fire of July 2008 [here] on the Plumas NF. It is yet another demonstration of efficacy of fuels management.

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Rich Wildfire Fuel Treatment Effectiveness Report, January 2009 [here]

Location Information:
Region: 05
Forest: Plumas
District: Mount Hough

Wildfire Information (consistent with 5100-29):
Fire Number: CA-PNF-000784
Fire Name: Rich Fire
Date of fire start mm/dd/yr: 07/29/2008
Final fire size (ac): 6,112
Date when fire entered treatment (if different from start date): 07/30/2008
Treated Area Burned: 342 Acres
Date Fire Contained: 08/09/2008

Fuel Treatment Information:
Kingsbury-Rush DFPZ (Defense Fuel Profile Zone) was approved in June 2001 under the HFQLG Framework as amended by the January 2001 ROD.
There were 5 prescriptions in the DFPZ boundary, all were service contracts. No timber sales were used to implement this project.

Narrative:

The Rich Fire was a human caused fire that started at the bottom of the Feather River Canyon about 1500 on July 29, 2008. The fire was first managed by the local initial attack resources, next by the Type II Incident Management Team (IMT) working other fires in the area, and finally by a Type I IMT ordered by the Plumas National Forest.

Outside the fuel treatment area the fire intensity was moderate with high scorch heights and significant tree mortality. Inside the treatment area, the fire intensity was low with low scorch heights and low tree mortality. The fire inside this treated area burned with a low spread rate due to a lack of ladder and ground fuel which had been removed by the earlier fuel treatments. One of the Division Supervisors from the Type 1 IMT reported that the fire column was reduced significantly and the spread rates slowed down when the fire hit the ridge (fuelbreak).

This person noted that any and all direct suppression efforts became successful in the area of the fuelbreak. Before the fire hit this area, only indirect methods at the head of the fire were successful. The fuelbreak slowed the fire so much that incident resources were able to concentrate the suppression effort on higher priority areas closer to communities and deferred suppression efforts at the head of the fire and the fuelbreak.

The ridge top fuel break, where the Rich Fire entered the Kingsbury-Rush DFPZ [Defensible Fuel Profile Zone], had been commercially thinned, grapple piled, and burned in the late 1990s prior to Herger-Feinstein Quincy Library Group (HFQLG) legislation. At that time the thinning resulted in canopy closure of approximately 30%. The area was further treated as a HFQLG DFPZ with mastication, hand piling and burning completed with HFQLG funding in 2003 - 2005. The combination of treatments aided in the suppression effort and certainly allowed for the lessened tree mortality. There are continuing debates as to the appropriate canopy reduction to reduce fire behavior; however the 30% canopy cover in this study was shown to have a successful effect in decreasing the fire behavior.

The Kingsbury-Rush DFPZ was used to help contain the Rich Fire. Three hundred forty two acres of the DFPZ burned in the Rich Fire. Overall, the intensity of the fire was lower in the DFPZ and preliminary reconnaissance indicates greater tree survival in the treated versus untreated area.

Because of the fire’s proximity to communities, the fire was given a high priority for allocation of suppression resources. This aided in the positive fire suppression outcome. In addition, the ridge top location of the fuel break and gentler terrain beyond also aided in this outcome. However, a fire that was expected to burn long into the summer, costing additional money, tying up valuable fire fighting resources and damaging natural resources in an area that had already seen tremendous fire activity, quickly ran out of steam when it hit the DFPZ. Incident resources were able to suppress the fire before it could get into other valuable communities and watersheds.

*****

Note to morons: It’s the fuels, stupid.

There is no consensus about global warming, but there IS a consensus about fuels and fire.

No fuels, no fire. Limited fuels, limited fire. Abundant fuels, abundant fire.

It’s as simple as that.